Representative democracy

Hi. I’m Geoff Pynn, and I teach philosophy at Elgin Community College. In this video, I’m going to talk about the idea of representative democracy. Governments routinely make decisions and take actions with very high stakes. They are likely to either benefit all of society, or harm all of society. So we’d like to be confident that the people making the decisions know what they’re doing. So then why let the people themselves make these decisions? Why should we have any confidence in the ability of ordinary citizens to make wise decisions affecting all of society? This question lies at the heart of Plato’s ancient objection to democracy. Given that ordinary people tend to be ignorant about matters affecting society as a whole, and given that they will naturally favor policies that serve their own interests, democratic rule is unlikely to succeed. Even if it can manage to avoid being hijacked by a demagogue, it’s likely to leave society in ruins. Jean-Jacques Rousseau thought the challenge could be met by training citizens in patriotic virtue from an early age, minimizing inequality, and restricting religious and social freedoms to discourage factionalism and self-interested voting. But could even these far-reaching measures do the trick in a diverse interconnected society like ours? And even if they could, would the costs to individual liberty be worth it? In modern democracies, the people’s role is much more limited than the citizens’ assemblies envisioned by Rousseau. Most democratic citizens rarely, if ever, vote on specific policies. Instead, they vote for representatives who will make complex policy decisions on their behalf. If you grew up in the United States, you might have learned in school that the US is not, in fact, a democracy, but a republic -- precisely because, in the US, the laws are made by elected representatives. That’s a false dichotomy, as can be seen from the fact that many countries are called democratic republics, with no apparent contradiction. Still, you might wonder: how democratic is a representative democracy, really? Well, even Rousseau agreed that when it came to actually administering the functions of government, democracy was inferior to what he called an “elected aristocracy,” where the officials in charge of doing what the people have decided should be done are selected on the basis of their wisdom and virtue. You don’t want random groups of citizens enforcing traffic laws, collecting taxes, fighting fires, or building bridges. That would be a recipe for disaster. Instead, you want people who have the relevant skills and knowledge -- and for those people to be held accountable for their work. But if ordinary people aren’t qualified to administer government policies, why think they are qualified to choose good policies in the first place? An incompetent law could damage society even more profoundly than an incompetent administration could. John Stuart Mill thought that the only viable form of democratic government in the modern world was representative democracy. For one thing, society is just too large for direct democratic rule to be feasible. But Mill also echoed Plato’s concern about the qualifications of ordinary citizens to make wise policy decisions: “At its best, it is inexperience sitting in judgment on experience, ignorance on knowledge: ignorance never suspecting the existence of what it does not know…” Mill was an advocate of the ethical theory known as utilitarianism, which says that the best course of action is always to do whatever provides the greatest overall benefits to society as a whole. Utilitarianism formed the basis of Mill’s defense of democracy. He thought democracy benefited society more than any alternative system could. And since wise, well-informed, well-intentioned legislators are more likely to produce beneficial policies than are ignorant, possibly ill-intentioned citizens, representative democracy is preferable to direct democracy on utilitarian grounds. So then why did Mill advocate for democracy at all? If a representative democracy is preferable to a direct democracy, wouldn’t a society ruled by benevolent experts be even better? The answer lies in Mill’s ideas about the positive effects of democracy and democratic citizenship. He thought citizens in non-democratic societies tend to become passive observers of life, rather than active, independent people who take charge of their own lives. Not only does passivity make people vulnerable to oppression, individual autonomy is one of the keys to living a happy life. Democratic societies support the development of autonomous individuals in many ways. Moreover, Mill thought that the evidence was clear that democratic states produce greater overall benefits for society than do undemocratic ones: “Contrast the free states of the world, while their freedom lasted, with the contemporary subjects of monarchical or oligarchical despotism: the Greek cities with the Persian satrapies; the Italian republics and the free towns of Flanders and Germany, with the feudal monarchies of Europe … Their superior prosperity was too obvious ever to have been gainsaid: while their superiority in good government and social relations is proved by prosperity, and is manifest besides in every page in history.” Mill’s case for representative democracy ultimately rests on its real-world benefits, rather than on abstract arguments concerning rights, liberty, and equality. But what if bad candidates win elections? Isn’t a representative democracy just as vulnerable to hijacking by a demagogue as a direct democracy is? Incompetent or tyrannical representatives would almost certainly undermine the social benefits of democracy. How can we ensure that elected representatives really do serve the public interest? Mill made a number of proposals. Some are familiar from contemporary discussions. He defended strict limitations on campaign spending to prevent vote buying. And he thought that elected representatives should be unpaid, in order to discourage them from seeking office for personal gain. He also proposed some more controversial measures: First, he argued against the use of secret ballots. He thought open voting would discourage people from casting votes for their personal gain, because of the public shame that would result; this, in turn, would lower the chances of unscrupulous candidates appealing to voters’ selfish interests. Second, he thought that voting should be restricted on the basis of education and income. No one who could not “read, write, and … perform the common operations of arithmetic” would be allowed to vote. Neither would anyone receiving public assistance, since “he who cannot by his labor suffice for his own support has no claim to the privilege of helping himself to the money of others”. And third, he denied the principle of “one person, one vote”. Instead, he thought that people with particularly high levels of educational achievement should be given multiple votes. Plato’s challenge to democracy remains a deep concern. How can we make sure that democratic citizens will choose laws in the best interests of society? Rousseau addressed this concern by introducing strict regulations on education, religion, and public morality -- at the apparent cost of individual liberty. Mill’s representative democracy instead removes citizens one step from decision making, and substantially restricts voting rights. Each approach departs from cherished democratic ideals. But maybe we just have to accept that the best form of government will always fall short of the ideal. Just as democratic decisions invariably require compromise, so might the philosophical defense of democracy. What do you think?