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Course: Wireless Philosophy > Unit 3
Lesson 1: Ethics- Ethics: The Problem of Evil
- Ethics: Problem of Evil, Part 1
- Ethics: Problem of Evil, Part 2
- Ethics: Problem of Evil, Part 3
- Ethics: God and Morality, Part 1
- Ethics: God and Morality, Part 2
- Ethics: Moral Status
- Ethics: Killing Animals for Food
- Ethics: Hedonism and The Experience Machine
- Ethics: Consequentialism
- Ethics: Utilitarianism, Part 1
- Ethics: Utilitarianism, Part 2
- Ethics: Utilitarianism, Part 3
- Ethics: The Problem of Moral Luck
- Ethics: The Nonidentity Problem
- Ethics: The Nonidentity Problem, Part 2
- Ethics: Symmetry Argument Against the Badness of Death
- Ethics: Promising Against the Evidence #1
- Ethics: Promising Against the Evidence #2
- Ethics: Know Thyself #1 (The Examined Life)
- Ethics: Consent #1 (What is Consent?)
- Ethics: Consent #2 (Consent and Rights)
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Ethics: Symmetry Argument Against the Badness of Death
Almost everyone fears death. But is this fear rational? Should we fear death? In this Wireless Philosophy video, Travis Timmerman (Seton Hall University) discusses the Symmetry Argument against the badness of death. He explains why one of the most popular responses to the argument fails. He also offers his own response, one that preserves the judgment that death can be bad for the one who dies.
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I've never met a single person who held premise 1 when accounting for the world getting better in time on average. I imagine the only way anyone could say they do is when they didn't understand the obviously confusing question (after all it is asking about something impossible).
This begs a question, where did the premise 1 come from? From this misunderstanding?(3 votes)