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Course: Wireless Philosophy > Unit 7
Lesson 2: The neural correlates of consciousnessThe neural correlates of consciousness
In this Wireless Philosophy video, we consider what neuroscience can tell us about how events in your brain are related to your particular conscious experiences. When neuroscientists explain your visual experience of movement in terms of activity in certain parts of your brain, for example, are they saying that this experience is identical to this brain activity? If not, how should we understand this relationship?
View our Neuroscience and Philosophy learning module and other videos in this series here: https://www.wi-phi.com. Created by Gaurav Vazirani.
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- Is it just me or are all of these videos not working?! I am having trouble watching not just this video but all of the ones in this unit! Is this something on my part or is everyone having this issue? Thanks in advance and I realize that this may not be answered for a while and that is okay!! : ) *(Actually while going through the rest of this course I found that none of it works! Everything after this unit does not let you watch the video and it is kind of disappointing. I hope that whatever is wrong with this can be fixed and soon so that not only me but others may enjoy the rest of this course!)
*Edit(2 votes)- Yes, I cannot access this unit too. Not sure if they unplugged it. Is there anyway to let the admin know?(1 vote)
Video transcript
[ Jingle ] In this video, we’ll explore
the idea that your conscious experiences can be identified with particular
states of your brain. Ever wondered why eating, drinking, playing sports,
listening to music or having sex makes you feel good? One explanation you may have heard is that all of these
activities make your brain release a chemical called dopamine. Neuroscientists have found that increased dopamine levels
are closely associated with the experience of pleasure. Of course, the actual science of dopamine
and pleasure is much more complicated. But for the sake of philosophy,
we can do with a simplified example. Suppose that neuroscientists can
identify the distinctive brain states and processes associated with the
conscious experience of pleasure. In other words, they’ve identified the neural
correlates of a type of conscious experience. Does that mean that a particular conscious experience
is a particular state or event in your brain? What does neuroscience
actually tell us about consciousness? Well, first let’s clarify what we mean
by “consciousness”. Our focus is on what is called
‘phenomenal consciousness.’ Phenomenal consciousness concerns
the way our experiences seem to us. Think about it like this. For conscious
creatures, things always feel some way or another. In other words, there is something it is like
to be a human being, a bat, a mouse, and so on. This aspect of our experience - the way it feels-
is what we mean by ‘phenomenal consciousness’. By contrast, it doesn’t feel any particular way
to be a phone, a piece of cheese, or a bacterium. These objects
don’t have phenomenal consciousness. In addition to thinking about
what it’s like to be a human in general, we can also think about what
it’s like to have specific experiences, or to be in particular mental states. There is something it is like to see a sunset, to hear
a trombone, to taste coffee, to crave a glass of wine and to experience the good feelings we mentioned earlier.
These mental events all involve phenomenal consciousness. We aren’t trying to give a full definition
of phenomenal consciousness here. In fact, it seems likely that phenomenal
consciousness can’t really be defined. It is a bit like what jazz
trumpeter Louis Armstrong said about jazz: “If you got to
ask, you ain't never gonna get to know!” But now, at least, you have
a better idea of what we’re talking about. So, what would it mean to say that an episode of phenomenal
consciousness just is a certain neural process in the brain? When we say that two things are identical, what we
really mean is that there’s just one thing after all. If you say that Superman and Clark Kent are
identical, you mean that there’s just one person, who we can describe
both as Superman and as Clark Kent. So if we identify a particular episode of phenomenal
consciousness with a particular neural process, what we’re saying is that there’s really
just one thing, which we can describe either in terms
of what it’s like to taste an orange (say), or in terms of neurons and brain chemicals. Neurons and brain chemicals are
things we can study scientifically. So this identification implies that we
can, in principle, advance our understanding of phenomenal
consciousness through neuroscience. There are two
sides to any claim identifying two things. If Superman and Clark Kent are identical, that
means both that whenever Superman is around, so is Clark Kent, and that whenever
Clark Kent is around, so is Superman. As philosophers like to say, it means that the presence of Superman
is both necessary and sufficient for the presence of Clark Kent. Similarly, if we identify a neural process with
a conscious experience, we mean two things. First, we mean that the neural processis
necessary for the conscious experience; That is, that you can’t have that conscious experience
without the occurrence of that neural process. And second, we mean that it is sufficient
for the conscious experience; That is, that whenever that neural process occurs,
so does that conscious experience. So, does our current neuroscience
enable us to make such an identification? No, at least not yet. When neuroscientists are searching for the neural states
that are responsible for phenomenally conscious experiences, they aren’t actually looking for processes
that are identical to conscious experiences. Instead, they are looking for what we can call
‘difference-makers’ for phenomenal consciousness. They want to see what distinctive neural states and processes
are involved in conscious states of different types. It’s kind of like coming across a row of light switches,
and trying to figure out which one controls which light. For example, neuroscientists have found that a certain area of the visual
cortex called ‘MT+’ is associated with the visual experience of motion. This might suggest that activity in MT+ is
necessary for the conscious experience of motion, just like you might find that a particular light
only turns on when you flip a particular switch. But it’s not plausible that activity in MT+
is sufficient for that experience. Why not? Well, for one thing, we couldn’t generate
the visual experience of motion simply by putting a slice of MT+ in a bottle and
putting an electric current through it. Flipping a switch on the wall
isn’t sufficient for turning on a light you also need a source of power, functional
wiring, light bulbs that work, and so on. Similarly, having a particular experience requires much
more than just activity in a particular part of the brain. So particular neural processes can’t really be
identified with the conscious experience of motion. Instead, we should think of them as
“difference makers” for such experience. Where does this leave us when it comes
to a neuroscience of consciousness? Neuroscientists are making great
strides in identifying the neural processes that make a difference to particular
phenomenally conscious experiences. But this is just one piece of the puzzle. To identify phenomenally conscious experiences
with certain neural processes in the brain, we need to identify the processes
that are sufficient for such experiences. And there
is a lot more work to do on this front. what do you think [ Jingle ]